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ABSTRACT
In this Major Qualifying Project, we focus on the development of a visualization-enabledanomaly detection system. We examine the 2011 VAST dataset challenge to efficientlygenerate meaningful features and apply Robust Principal Component Analysis (RPCA) to
detect any data points estimated to be anomalous. This is done through an infrastructure that
promotes the closing of the loop from feature generation to anomaly detection through RPCA.
We enable our user to choose subsets of the data through a web application and learn through
visualization systems where problems are within their chosen local data slice. In this report, we
explore both feature engineering techniques along with optimizing RPCA which ultimately lead
to a generalized approach for detecting anomalies within a defined network architecture.
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INTRODUCTION
By Guth, Sola, and Velarde
1.1 Introduction
It would be difficult to speak on the successes of technology in past years without discussing
the recent attacks on user data. The data explosion from technological growth has armed analysts
with new strategies for predicting or detecting malicious activity. Taking data from previous
attacks can help us prevent or stop future ones from emerging. This method of preventing attacks
can be summarized as finding outliers in a data set – or an anomaly. An anomaly is a data point
that veers away normal trends in a data set. From credit card fraud detection to cybersecurity at-
tacks, detecting anomalies has become vital in ensuring privacy. Nevertheless, due to differences
between data in these domains, a generalized solution for detecting out of the ordinary behavior
becomes challenging. In this paper, we will focus on anomaly detection in cybersecurity of the
2011 VAST dataset challenge.
Between the Internet of Things, the rapid advancement of technology and the lack of regula-
tion in the past years, security has become a primary concern for millions of users. In addition,
anomaly detection in networks has various layers of mathematical complexity. Deciding which
data points seem out of place requires precise analysis of data. This, coupled with the enormous
size of data sets, subtle correlation between data points, and potential long system waits for each
run cycle makes the process known as feature engineering non-trivial [9].
Security issues have been steadily present in software companies as technology continues to
grow in use and complexity. Considering how heavily embedded technology has become in every-
day life, cybersecurity is an issue of the highest priority. Damage costs alone from cyber attacks
are projected to reach $6 trillion by 2021 and breaches of personal information are occurring with
higher frequency as time progresses [53]. Over the past years, government records have been
victimized of cyber attacks, for example, the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA)
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experienced a security breach within its IRS retrieval application. This led to roughly 100,000
taxpayers information being compromised [6]. As time and technology progresses, malicious
infiltrations such as the FAFSA breach become increasingly more difficult to predict or detect. To
protect user information, avoid denial of service attacks, along with other types of infiltration, it
is vital to detect what has gone wrong in the past regarding security. Determining the root cause
of these issues assist improving the security of critical information and user privacy.
Anomaly detection has been researched extensively for cybersecurity due to the complexities
that it entails. The University of Minnesota’s, Anomaly Detection: A survey, looked at using
network intrusions detection systems to find anomalies. However, detecting anomalous behavior
through network data comes with several challenges. This type of dataset is inherently high
dimensional and the domain continuously changes over time as intruders adapt and overcome
intrusion detections advancements [23].
In this Major Qualifying Project (MQP), we examined ways to diversify a dataset through
feature engineering and analyze its relationship with Robust Principal Component Analysis
(RPCA). Our contributions were the following:
• Created a user-friendly visualization system.
• Closed the loop between feature generation, mathematical analysis, and visualization.
• Improved overall experience of system administrators by creating a streamlined process
through careful construction of sound infrastructure in our code base.
This report explains in depth what anomaly detection is, its process, the different statistical
analysis methods that we will use or recommend to use, what feature engineering is, and the
impact that the original data set we used had on our project along with the assumptions made.
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VAST DATASET CHALLENGE
By Sola and Velarde
For this project, we used the 2011 VAST dataset [5]. This dataset included network architec-
ture descriptions, security policy issues, firewall logs, an intrusion detection system (IDS) log, and
a Nessus Network Vulnerability Scan Report [27] for the All Freight Corporation (AFC) [5]. The
goal of the challenge was to develop situation awareness interfaces that provide insight quickly,
clearly, and as efficiently as possible to help manage daily business operations while mitigating
network vulnerabilities. In this chapter, we will explain the structure of AFC’s network and the
associated dataset.
2.1 2011 VAST Dataset
Feature engineering refers to the process of using knowledge of data to create features that
can make machine learning algorithms function [52]. More specifically, this refers to attributes
that could contribute to the analysis of data to help with its prediction or analysis. Features are
characteristics of data that will help distinguish each row of data from each other. For example, a
feature would be whether or not a log entry is using a port that has a specific type of vulnerability.
This feature becomes relevant as we know that attacks are more likely to come from a computer
that might be vulnerable. In general, features surround the balance between finding as much
relevant data as possible to ensure that it is unique enough to make an impact in the prediction
models.
The dataset includes a folder of firewall logs for four separate days April 13 - 16 of 2011. Each
day has one corresponding log file. However, in the instance that the number of rows exceeds
Excel’s row limit multiple files are created. April 13 is such a case, where there exists more than
one log file. There are certain nodes within the dataset that are critical for AFC’s network to
function properly. It is to be noted that AFC uses virtual machines within their network. In
3
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table 2.1, all nodes are described in the VAST dataset challenge; any node outside 172.x.x.x and
192.x.x.x is external to AFC’s network.
IP Address Node Name Node Type Description Priority
10.200.150.1 Firewall
Firewall interface to
the Internet
High
172.20.1.1 Firewall
Firewall interface to
External Web Server
High
172.20.1.5
External Web
Server
Web server which
hosts All Freight’s
external web site
High
192.168.1.16 Snort IDS
Snort Intrusion
Detection System
Snort IDS interface to
the network
High
192.168.1.1 Firewall
Firewall interface to
data center Virtual
Local Area Network
(VLAN)
High
192.168.2.1 Firewall
Firewall interface to of-
fice VLAN
High
192.168.1.2 DC01
Domain Con-
troller (DC) /
Domain Name
System (DNS)/
Dynamic Host
Configuration
Protocol (DHCP)
serve
Server running critical
network operations:
domain controller,
domain name server,
and dynamic host
configuration protocol
server
High
192.168.1.3 HRDB01
HR Database
Server
Server running the
database for employee
payroll and benefits
High
192.168.1.4 SRDB01
Shipping / Rout-
ing Database
Server
Server containing cus-
tomer data, including
shipping requests and
routing information
High
4
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192.168.1.5 WEB01
Internal web
server
Server that hosts All
Freight’s corporate in-
tranet, including com-
pany news site and pol-
icy and procedure man-
uals
High
192.168.1.5 WEB01
Internal web
server
Server that hosts All
Freight’s corporate in-
tranet, including com-
pany news site and pol-
icy and procedure man-
uals
High
192.168.1.6 EX01 Mail server
Server that stores and
routes all email that
flows into, out of, or in-
ternal to All Freight
High
192.168.1.7 FS01 File Server
Server that holds
shared files used by
workers throughout
All Freight
High
192.168.1.14 DC2 DC / DNS server
Server running critical
network operations:
domain controller and
domain name server
High
192.168.1.50 Firewall log
Server that captures
system firewall logs
High
192.168.2.10
through
192.168.2.250
Office worksta-
tions
Individual worksta-
tion computers located
in offices or cubicles
throughout All Freight
Normal
Table 2.1: AFC registered network description. [5].
Important data flow descriptions are:
• Connections outside of the AFC network
– Web traffic enters with IP address 10.200.150.1 and through port 80.
– Firewall routes traffic to the external web server on 172.20.1.5 address and through
port 80.
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• Email from outside AFC network
– Enter AFC’s network with IP address 10.200.150.1 through port 25.
– Firewall routes traffic to the mail server on IP address 192.168.1.6.
• All AFC staff members use IP addresses 192.168.2.10-250 to browse the internet.
All information above retrieved from VAST dataset challenge description. Fully understand-
ing the structure of a dataset and how data flows in AFC’s network is critical to the success of
this project and taken into consideration during its execution. In general, a company’s policy and
security contract should be taken into consideration when creating features.
2.2 Attacks in the VAST Dataset
In addition to the resources mentioned above, the VAST dataset also includes a solutions
manual. The answer guide reveals all attacks and steps that led to finding the security vulnera-
bilities in the VAST dataset. Below are summaries of each attack over the course of four days
according to the solution manual.
Type of Attack Date of Attack Description
Denial Of Service Attack
(DDoS)
04/13/2011 at 11:39 and ended
roughly an hour later at 12:51
A DDoS attack aims to dis-
rupt a user’s interaction with a
system. By using client/server
technology an attacker can
flood requests of a network,
rendering that network use-
less or experiencing delayed
speeds [62]. Throughout this
time period there was an at-
tempt to disrupt a corporate
web server, most likely to de-
lay network speeds.
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Remote Desktop Connection 04/14/2011 at 13:31 Documented violation of cor-
porate policy within the fire-
wall logs. This is part of a so-
cially engineered attack that
suggests substantial security
risk such as a worm in AFC’s
network.
Undocumented Computer 04/14/2011 13:23 There was an addition of
an undocumented computer
in the company internal net-
work. The policy descriptions
for AFC said that the work-
station computers would be
in the range 192.168.2.25-250.
The particular IP address for
this computer is 192.168.2.251.
Although we do not have the
background for this computer,
the addition of it to the com-
pany network is concerning
enough that it should be no-
ticed.
Table 2.2: Attack Descriptions on VAST dataset [5]
2.3 Avoiding Data Snooping
Data snooping is when an algorithm can cheat through previous knowledge of the answers
rather than depend on how data presents itself normally. We used the context of the attacks
mentioned above to verify the validity of our features and assist with the iterative feature
engineering process. One of our primary concerns of having the answers was the possibility of
data snooping. Although we did take inspiration from knowing the attacks and previous MQPs,
we limited ourselves to not seeing the answers until we had our first iterations of features. After
observing the answers, we analyzed the problems in general to create features that would have
the capabilities to solve these issues in a generalized way. For example, when we noted the
Remote Desktop attack, we thought about all different types of protocols that could indicate
that a computer is being connected from a suspicious place and how ports can hint at suspicious
activity.
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2.4 Previous Work
In the previous year, there was an MQP that focused on an anomaly detection system.
After analysis of their work, we determined that their application was set up in a way that
created a disconnected loop of work between mathematicians and computer scientists. From the
computer science side, there were matrices of features developed and sent to mathematicians for
analysis. These matrices were derived from the 2011 VAST dataset challenge. It was important
to determine how their features were produced from this data.
After a code analysis, we determined that the VAST 2011 dataset was ingested into a Python
script and then the resulting feature matrix was inserted into a mySQL [10] database. The
mySQL tables were statically defined, meaning that the table schema was established during the
creation of the feature matrix with a predetermined set of columns. We believe that this posed
a problem for a generalized solution. Our initial thought was to research ways of dynamically
creating the table schema for the mySQL table. To do this, we chose to optimize the process of
running the project and feature matrix creation. Our Python script allowed the feature matrix
to be read for mathematical analysis and from here, rows were marked as anomalous or not.
This was done with the ground truth from the solution manual and served for cross validation
of attacks. The main problem with the previous MQP project was the disconnect between each
step in the iterative loop, this needed to be streamlined. With the past MQP’s structure of feature
generation and math analysis, we chose to close the loop that began with feature engineering,
passed to mathematical analysis, and resulted in visualization.
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ANOMALIES IN CYBER SECURITY
By Sola and Velarde
The exponential increase of technology in the past years has made malicious intrusions in
networks substantially harder to detect anomalies. The heavy integration of technology into our
lives has made detecting intrusions all the more important [24]. Anomaly detection involves
looking at previous data and searching for behavior that exists out of the norm. Anomaly detection
methods create the possibility to find unknown attacks on a system once a normality has been
defined. However, false positives are still possible due to the unpredictable nature of network use.
3.1 Anomaly detection methods
Anomaly detection is the process of finding data that is out of the ordinary and does not
conform to previous data trends [23]. The difficulty levels to find anomaly corresponds to the
layers of complexity a dataset provides.
In Figure 3.1, it is obvious to see that there are points that do not behave as the rest of the
data. It is important to note that in this example there are only two dimensions. In a real world
example there can be multiple dimensions. Each dimension adds another layer of complexity
and can affect or even hide anomalous behavior [23]. One example is network data and traffic.
Network data consists of communicating with multiple computers or nodes [45]. Figure 3.2 is an
example of how complex network traffic can look in comparison to the simple example above.
In Figure 3.2, we see multiple systems communicating with each other. Each node in this
diagram represents a layer of complexity in a network. Finding behavior that is out of the norm
with everything taken into consideration very quickly becomes a daunting task. With more data
ingested at a fast rate, data becomes noisy and harder to filter through. Regarding network data it
is vital to filter through this noise. “Network traffic anomalies reflect the anomalous or malicious
9
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Figure 3.1: Example of anomaly in two dimensional space [23].
Figure 3.2: Example of dimensionality in network traffic. Each node represents another layer of
complexity. This makes detecting anomalies a non-trivial task [23]
behaviors that appear in the network. Discovering exact/actual network traffic anomalies is
to effectively contain these anomalous or malicious behaviors that damage the network” [76].
These network traffic anomalies communicate a story of attacks in cyber security and it is the
responsibility of anomaly detection methods to ensure that they are caught and examined. The
question that many experts are posing is which anomaly detection methods are best and how can
we better prepare ourselves for unknown attacks [14].
Different project paradigms require different types of anomaly detection methods [23]. Testing
different types of anomaly detection methods can result in an increased chance of finding
anomalous behavior [14]. In recent years, the different types of anomaly detections methods have
skyrocketed. This stems from advancements in technology and an increase in targetable domains
[14]. The challenge lies in identifying the correct type of anomaly detection method (ADM) for a
10
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domain. Many anomaly detection methods have different requirements and prerequisites that can
makes the process even more difficult. Below is a general architecture for an anomaly detection
system.
Figure 3.3: General architecture of anomaly detection system from (Chandola et al., 2009) [23]
Although Figure 3.3 is a generalized example of an anomaly detection system, it accu-
rately describes the steps that are taken into consideration for examining a dataset. The actual
anomaly detection engine is what will normally vary. There are several examples of anomaly
detection methods. Monowar H. Bhuyan, D. K. Bhattacharyya, and J. K. Kalita’s [23] paper
mentioned above categorizes network intrusion methods into the following categories: statistical,
classification-based, clustering and outlier-based, soft computing, knowledge-based and combina-
tion learners. Most of these anomaly detection methods use some form of feature engineering to
optimize their anomaly detection algorithms. Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya, Kalita argue that “feature
selection reduces computational complexity, removes information redundancy, increases the
accuracy of the detection algorithm, facilitates data understanding and improves generalization”
[14]. It is therefore, important that the feature selection process is carefully chosen based on a
dataset.
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FEATURE ENGINEERING
By Sola and Velarde
Feature engineering is analyzing data to carefully separate data points in a useful way. The
goal is to diversify and create meaningful distances between data points. To be more specific,
when analysts first receive data, it might have what seems as redundant or not specific enough
information. As stated in chapter 3, feature selection enhances anomaly detection algorithms.
In order to choose which data points are anomalies, you have to select which details need to be
analyzed, and most importantly, how. One of the challenges about data mining is the different
perspective that a user or analyst can have in comparison with a developer. Looking at the
problem domain from two different perspectives can derive to a different set of features. [69].
4.1 Feature Engineering Process
The process of feature engineering is an iterative one that ceases when the end goal of a
project is met. The process is defined below by Dr. Jason Brownlee [19]:
1. Preprocess Data: Format it, clean it, sample it so you can work with it.
a) This may involve deleting certain columns after determining any irrelevancies.
b) Changing the format of certain columns, such as time-stamps or unwanted characters.
2. Transform Data: Feature selection happens here.
a) The feature library consists of several uniquely identifying characteristics of the data.
b) Features should not be made for the sake of creation. For example, a timestamp
feature would diversify your data; however, that might not help you achieve your goal.
3. Model Data: Create models, evaluate them and fine tune them.
12
4.2. FEATURE SELECTION FOR A DATASET
a) After receiving results from the feature selection, how will you visualization or present
your findings? How can the transformed data set be modeled to communicate a
message?
b) Ensure that your features tell a story within your modeling of data.
Through each iteration of this process more is revealed about a dataset and features are fine
tuned until a best fit is found. The best fit varies for each project. Overall, it is important to
consider if features are thoughtfully chosen and if through the modeling of features a story is
clearly communicated.
4.2 Feature Selection For a Dataset
What specifically defines a feature is what makes feature engineering both challenging, and
interesting. Intuitively, one may think of a feature as system functionality that helps characterize
the system in the perspective of a human. However, this definition tends to be perceived in
different ways, causing confusion and conflicting opinions [69]. Using the time entry of a data
point, for example, could be considered a feature because it makes each log entry into a separate
data point. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily describe the system or how it works. A separate
challenge with feature engineering is the limit of file sizes. Although in an ideal world, you could
create a feature for each uniquely identifying characteristic, it’s imperative to consider what is
possible with the current computational power, and prioritize which features may lead to solving
a problem. The selection of features is a task which requires an analytical approach. A dataset
must be examined to define which characteristics should be made unique. As mentioned above,
choosing the wrong features will not help in the modeling of a dataset and can hinder the problem
that feature engineering aims to solve. In the feature selection step is it vital to remove attributes
of data that may make a dataset “noisy” and skew any modeling while limiting the number of
features to those of higher importance [19].
4.3 Time Series Feature Generation
Although features tend to describe characteristics of a specific dataset, anomaly searching can
require an introspective view of your specific domain. Network security has unique attributes that
are imperative towards understanding how the network itself is functioning. Osman Ramadan
[57], decided to use the number of distinct source and destination ports/IP’s and the sum of
bytes for each source over a period of time as features since he knew that this could describe a
change in the network’s normal behavior, like a DDoS attack [57]. Our dataset did not include
the exact number of bytes transferred within each request. However, in light of his findings we
decided to see if it would be possible to derive a similar concept. How could we analyze when a
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source/destination port/ip was experiencing a change in the network? Questions such as these
are key to help us derive rules for modeling data and create our anomaly detection system.
4.4 Feature Engineering Generation
In the following sections we will discuss the process of our feature generation on the VAST
dataset. The goal was to generate a set of features that increases uniqueness among the dataset in
preparation for mathematical analysis, such as RPCA. Over the course of the project’s completion
we followed the iterative process defined above. Below is an example of the loop that resulted
in our feature library. In this section, we also explain the workflow of the project. We will go in
depth for each step and the part it played in closing the loop in this MQP.
Figure 4.1: A goal of this project was to create a system that closes the loop between an anomaly
detecting system and visualization.
Once this cycle has converged as a result of an optimal feature set, the next step is visualiza-
tion. This step will be described in depth in chapter 7.
4.5 Feature Generation Infrastructure
In the following sections, the process of choosing our features for the VAST dataset will be
described. This section aims to explain the flow of work that led to the efficient generation of
our feature library. As described above, a challenge that lies in feature generation is the size of
the dataset. In the VAST dataset, with all 4 days of logs, there are roughly 12.5 million rows.
Through trial and error, it was determined that we could not feasibly automate and streamline
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the feature generation process with the entire dataset. Processing the data would require very
long system waits for feature generation. To mitigate this problem, a Python script functions as
a manager for all of the scripts that produce our feature library. Our backend is created using
Flask [59], a micro-web framework written in Python to build our web application. This manager
is used within our Flask backend explained in chapter 7, and our web application to obtain a
desired time slice for a specific log file. This makes it much more manageable to generate features
and test different slices.
Our manager also bears the responsibility of running mathematical analysis. It assists with
easy experimentation of our algorithm, as explained in chapter 4. It is to be noted that feature
generation occurs with Python 2.7 and math analysis uses Python 3.6. There are ways to translate
Python 2 to Python 3 with libraries such as Futurize [64] but with several moving components
in our code base and not anticipating this problem in the beginning of the project we decided to
not convert our code. One could imagine, that with time, a manager could be written entirely
in one Python version or one that utilizes the something such as the Futurize library. As with
many Python projects, we decided to develop from within a virtual environment using Python’s
VirtualEnv [15]. We took advantage of this decision and have two Python virtual environments,
one for Python 2.7 and one with Python 3.6. All dependencies are clearly defined within our code
repository readme [65]. Our manager begins feature generation code in the Python 2.7 virtual
environment and a bash script is started once feature generation is complete. This bash script
deactivates the Python 2.7 virtual environment, activates the Python 3.6 environment to run
our math algorithm on the feature matrix csv file. This process closes the gap between computer
science and mathematical analysis. What follows is the visualization step of the results for a
user, this is explained in more detail in Chapter 6. A user can use this manager and examine any
number of ranges for any log. Another advantage of having a manager script is that adding or
removing specific feature sets become infinitely easier.
Since the feature generation process is an iterative one that constantly aims to improve
in order to optimize the anomaly detection algorithm, creating a pipeline for this project was
necessary. This pipeline allowed us to test several different time slices and assisted with the best
fit convergence of our feature library.
4.6 Source and Destination IP Address Feature Sets
The goal output of our features is to create a hot encoded matrix in Excel, or a numerical
value to demonstrate if a characteristic applies to the data point [45]. It is difficult to apply
anomaly detection methods if the features are not chosen carefully. In our features, every IP
address was converted to an integer using Python’s struct library. In this section we will describe
the trials of deciding how to diversify the IP addresses within the dataset.
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4.6.1 Original Feature For Every Unique Source and Destination IP
We used a script in order to find every unique source and destination IP address and we
dynamically generated features from this. This script examined a user specified slice of the
dataset and generated all of the corresponding distinct IP addresses. From here our feature
manager starts another script that will create the feature matrix with respect to these distinct
IP addresses. All IP addresses are converted to integers as explained above. Source IP addresses
have the prefix "sip_" followed by the integer IP address and destination IP addresses have
the prefix "dip_" followed by the integer IP address. Below is an example of how the source IP
addresses may be displayed within this specific feature set.
sip_18091791 sip_18091792 sip_18091793 sip_32322361 sip_32322362
0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
Table 4.1: Original IP Address feature example. In this feature set, there is a columns for every
distinct IP address.
This matrix is then inserted into a mySQL table for easy manipulation of data. For example,
join in each IP address to a vulnerability scan is one example that can be used in feature
generation that would require that flexibility. By having each unique source and destination IP
address be its own feature we diversify the dataset and widen our matrix. However, it is important
to note the impact that doing this could have on the math analysis and other overall infrastructure
of our project. If a user defines a very large time slice of the dataset, the dynamically created
features could number in the thousands. This makes it difficult to insert data into mySQL and
make queries on it since the table would become so large. For example, if we run our script to
generate features for every distinct source and destination IP address, along with our other
features, our table would have upwards of a thousand features. In addition, this feature set can
hurt the goal of anomaly detection if most of the used IP addresses are unique, since our math
algorithm could potentially flag each row as an anomaly. It can be argued that with smaller slices
this is a very feasible feature set and can help the diversification of the dataset.
4.6.2 Feature Engineering of the AFC Network IP Addresses
As mentioned in chapter 2, the VAST 2011 dataset challenge included a table of IP addresses
that describes the AFC company network architecture.
Figure 3.3, maps the overall transfer and communication of data within AFC’s network. All
of the IP addresses in this figure are referenced in chapter 2’s table. Our next IP address feature
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Figure 4.2: AFC Network Architecture. This outlines the workstation connections in AFC’s network
and which servers they communicate on. [5]
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set includes the thoughtful consideration of exclusively AFC’s network. For each IP address in
table 2.1 we have a source and destination feature. Similarly to the previous section’s feature
set, we prefix each IP address with "sip_" and "dip_" and convert each address to an integer.
In addition, there are two features responsible for characterizing any source or destination IP
addresses outside of AFC’s defined network called "sip_outside" and "dip_outside". Below is an
example of how these features look.
sip_outside sip_18091777 sip_18091793 sip_32322361 sip_32322362
0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
Table 4.2: Individual Column features for each AFC network IP address. With this feature set,
there is a column for every IP address defined in AFC’s network and there are two columns for
source and destination IP addresses outside the defined network.
There may be several reasons for communication with an outside IP address, however, it
is important to mark these IP addresses as they could be the root of malicious activity. In a
real world setting, one could imagine speaking with a network analyst at any given company
and asking for a similar network architecture diagram or table. By doing this, someone could
use our software and place their own IP addresses in a simple table in our Python script and
run their own feature generation. This is where our goal of a more generalized solution for
anomaly detection is accomplished. In the previous section, the features change from each feature
generation run cycle, but in this situation the feature set for IP addresses stay the same. This
feature set encompasses the entire AFC network architecture.
By mapping out each IP address in AFC’s network as a feature we characterize their company
specific architecture. This could make identifying specific workstations or other terminals as a
problem quite simple. As for marking outside sources the outside features can alert any source
or destination IP address that is external to the AFC network. In the next section we aim to
generalize the IP addresses even further.
4.6.3 Examining AFC Network IP Addresses Inside and Outside
This IP address features is a slight variation of the previous section. We wanted to try
another version of examining AFC’s network architecture. This set includes four features in
total: "sip_outside", "sip_inside", "dip_outside", and "dip_inside". Rather than having a feature for
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each IP address, we use these features and simply marked whether an IP addresses is in a user
defined slice is inside or outside the AFC network. Below is an example of how these features
look.
sip_outside sip_inside dip_outside dip_inside
0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1
Table 4.3: Examining only inside and outside source and destination IP addresses according to
AFC’s network architecture.
It was important to test several variations for the IP address features because this attribute
in the firewall log can tell an interesting story when it comes to suspicious activity. For the
"sip_inside" and "dip_inside" features we still ingest the AFC network architecture similar to the
previous section. However, in this set we consolidate all of those features into these two columns.
So every IP address defined in AFC’s network will be placed within those two columns. The
"sip_outside" and "dip_outside" functions the same as the previous section where all IP addresses
that are outside of AFC’s network will be marked there.
4.7 Ports
Ports can reveal much about abnormalities in network data. For this reason we found it
necessary to incorporate them into this project’s feature library. We created features for the ports
and grouped them according to overall significance to possible malicious attacks. Port numbers
below 1024 are known as system or well-known ports. They are specifically meant to be used for
certain applications and the system expects them to perform certain tasks. On the other spectrum,
ports above 1024 are ports and they can be used by users or are registered. An example is how
the 8080 port is registered for websites. For our features, we grouped all port numbers. Unique
source ports below 1024 all have their own column with a prefix, "special_source_port_" followed
by the port number. All other source ports above 1024 are grouped into a separate column. For the
destination ports, we also had two different grouping. Normally, a destination port will be port
number 80. Port 80 is used for web servers and "listens" to a client. Since, there is a high chance
that port 80 would be used frequently for destination ports we created a column for rows that
used port 80. We then classified each destination port that is not 80 as a special destination port.
We created a separate column of those ports with prefix, "special_destination_port_" followed by
the port number.
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In addition,we investigated ports that usually served a program or signaled a type of danger.
For example, port 3389 corresponds to the TCP and UDP ports that are used for Microsoft’s remote
desktop, software that you would not necessarily expect in a non-tech company. In addition, we
looked at strategic ports used by hackers or malicious software to have a wider range of ports that
could signal an attack. In the table below is a list of the ports that is included in our features.
Port Description/Threat
3389 Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) - Ports that
allows a user a graphical interface to connect
to another computer for Windows.
6783-6785 Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) SplashTop
53 DNS Exit Strategy and port used to create
DDOS attacks.
4444 Trojan to listen in on information
31337 Back Orifice backdoor and some other mali-
cious software programs
6660 - 6669 Internet Relay Chart (IRC) Vulnerabilities &
DDoS
12345 Netbus Trojan Horse
514 Explotable Shell
Table 4.4: Examined ports for feature generation. These ports have been exploited in years past
and could indicate a threat [1], [2], [72].
It was important to tag these ports as they could be critical to alerting a system administrators
of possible malicious behavior.
4.8 Averages
An interesting detail about network traffic, is that it is comprised of several layers to make
itself efficient and secure. Though normally one would examine packages sent and received to
characterize a network flow, that information is not always readily available. The VAST Dataset
did not include this; therefore, we needed to emulate how a network would work with the data
that we had available.
In order to develop a feature that encompassed anomalous numbers of requests, we had to
develop a feature that could encapsulate what a “regular” amount of requests were, and what
we considered to be out of that range. We considered this for source IP addresses, destination
IP addresses, source ports, and destination ports. We will refer to these as network parameters
in this section. To do this, we calculated the average of the network parameter requests per
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second. This would be able to detect if a parameter was used more or less than normal during a
certain time period. Doing so is critical to detecting attacks such as a DDoS attack. Each second
has a certain number of requests per parameter. For example, if you have an IP address as the
parameter, 192.0.0.1, and it appears three times in a period of one second, that is three requests
per second. Below are the steps that our Python script completes to calculate this feature.
1. Individually examine each second in the dataset as a slice
2. Retrieve the requests per second for each network parameter
3. Calculate average based on the network parameter
4. For each second for a network parameter divide it by the average requests per second
For each of the parameters mentioned above, a mySQL table is defined with the schema
depicted in table 4.5.
Field Type Null Key
date_time varchar(34) No Primary
[parameter] varchar(34) No Primary
Appearance per Sec-
ond
varchar(34) Yes
Final_Feature varchar(34) Yes
Final_Work_Feature varchar(34) Yes
Table 4.5: Average feature set table schema. This feature attempts to emulate the amount of
requests each network parameter made.
Since the table would be nearly identical, except the network parameter, we created a template
for the table creation. Similarly to the working set mySQL table, explained in chapter 4 section 5,
these tables are defined each time that the feature manager is ran with a different time slice. It
is important to note that these slices are not representative of the global dataset, but rather, a
just the slice a user chooses. There were a few reasons why we decided to keep these features
local rather than global. The last average feature’s purpose is to capture a significant change in
the network. If we used the global data, a DDoS attack, for example, could skew the data since it
will completely change the total work done by a system. Examining the slices locally can imitate
a real world system by analyzing a fixed number of logs, and as they come in the last average
feature theoretically would be able to capture the change. Finally, there was also a memory
component in the generation of the features. If we decided to use global data, in a real time
system it would need to be periodically updated when new logs come in, and it would increasingly
need more memory. By maintaining the logs locally, we reduce the amount of memory needed
and have much more efficient process to creating the features.
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In addition, a second feature was generated that looked at the amount of work that a specific
address or port generated of the total amount of work done in the system during that time.
Although the process is similar to retrieve the current work for the address/port, the difference is
that instead of dividing by the average work done, we divide by the total. What this accomplishes
is that it contrasts what we consider an above average address/port for the system with what the
total work on the system is done. Table 4.6 shows how our features were represented.
Source IP LastAver-
age
Destination IP Las-
tAverage
Source Port LastAver-
age
Destination Port Las-
tAverage
1.00 1.28 1.00 0.20
1.83 4.16 1.00 1.00
2.45 2.83 1.00 2.28
Table 4.6: Average feature example.
4.9 Vulnerability Scan Analysis
The vulnerability scan used was generated from a Nessus scan [27]. Nessus is a vulnerability
scanning platform, used mainly by security analysts. The Nessus vulnerability scan offers
information regarding a system’s health and if there are areas that malicious hackers could
utilize to cause harm. A parser [40] was used on the Nessus scan provided in the VAST dataset
to extract information relevant to our feature generation. Among these relevancies are the note,
hole, and Common Vulnerability Scoring System (cvss) parameters. Notes represent a security
warning and are indicators of behavior that is slightly out of the norm. A hole is representative of
a larger security warning, often critical to system health [27]. The cvss value ranges from 0 to 10
and provides further insight into the severity of these health warning indicators. Below is an
example of the vulnerability scan used before parsing.
Count Note Count Hole Max Severity Note Max Severity Hole
1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0
51 209 2.6 9.3
Table 4.7: We use the Nessus scan [27] to validate features. Here we examine the amount of notes
and holes per IP address.
To efficiently query IP addresses that could potentially be the root of a critical vulnerability,
the parsed values were stored in a mySQL table. Table 4.8 shows the schema of this table in
mySQL:
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Field Type Null Key
id int(11) No Primary
ip varchar(15) Yes
count_note varchar(4) Yes
count_hole varchar(4) Yes
max_severity_note varchar(15) Yes
max_severity_hole varchar(15) Yes
Table 4.8: Nessus Scan table schema. We used this table to join firewall logs and vulnerability
scan information.
Once the table is populated with these values it is joined with the mySQL features table.
The join occurs according to the IP address. The result is the features table with the addition
of these four vulnerability scan features. With these features it is simple to see exactly which
IP addresses are causing problems and will allow us to validate the accuracy of the formerly
mentioned features.
Features themselves focus on describing the data set rather than finding anomalies [36]. To
find anomalies using features, we depend on learning algorithms, which are used as a part of
machine learning to process information and determine patterns for a given dataset [3]. In the
next chapter, we will discuss different learning algorithm techniques and how they can affect
anomaly detection [3].
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LEARNING ALGORITHMS
By Guth
Once feature generation was completed, the data could be exported for mathematical analysis.
The extracted information was analyzed through statistical methods in an attempt to analytically
detect anomalies in the dataset. Various parameters were tested and produced results that
accurately detected anomalies when comparing the mathematical results to the ground truth
network data.
5.1 Supervised and Unsupervised Learning
There are many statistical methods that could be used as we are looking for relationships
between characteristics of network logs to find discrepancies and anomalies. Many statistical
methods were evaluated to help determine what would fit best for the network data being
analyzed, including different types of learning algorithms. Supervised learning includes statistical
approaches where possible results are already known, and the data being analyzed is labeled with
correct answers [33]. On the contrary, unsupervised learning algorithms can analyze data to find
patterns and relationships that might not have been known or examined before [30]. Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) is an unsupervised statistical approach used for data dimension
reduction and processing [79]. This is done by taking a data set of observations and converting
them to a set of linearly uncorrelated principal components for further analysis. By using a
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), a given matrix M ∈Rm×n can be broken down as follows:
[26]
M =UΣV T
where U ∈Rm×n is a unitary matrix, Σ ∈Rn×n which is a positive definite diagonal matrix with
zeros elsewhere, and V ∈Rn×n, also a unitary matrix [26]. The diagonal entries σi ∈Σ are known
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as the singular values of M, are similar but not always the same as eigenvalues. Singular values
are only equivalent to eigenvalues when the given matrix is real, symmetric, square, positive
definite matrix. As stated, PCA can be used for dimension reduction and to project matrices
onto a lower dimensional subspace, which would work well for finding anomalies within network
data. PCA unfortunately suffers from each principal component being a linear combination of all
original observations, making it difficult to interpret results and susceptible to outliers.
5.2 Singular Values
For the first subset of network data that was analyzed after preprocessing what was done,
the resulting matrix of network data logs was M ∈R5034×34. There were initially four logs in the
matrix that returned undefined for the IP addresses, which resulted in these rows being deleted
from the matrix as to not interfere with the analysis. Then, for an SVD to be produced for this
matrix, the first four columns of the matrix had to be ignored. These columns were id, destination
IP, source IP, and time log, and were not of values that could be computed for the new matrices.
This resulted in the matrix being trimmed down to a size of 5034 by 34, at which point the matrix
was factorized as an SVD producing the results below.
The Σ matrix contained 30 unique singular values (σi ) [21], corresponding to the 30 columns
in our adjusted matrix . These σi values declined in weight as they were expected to, and only the
first 13 σi values returned coefficients above zero. This means that with the largest 13 singular
values, we have the ability to predict the other 17 singular values for any log we’re given, allowing
us to predict the remaining information and details of an individual log if we know less than half
of it’s information. The 30 σi values can also be seen below in descending order. After the results
were produced, more analysis was done on the logs and columns of the network data that were
being produced. The matrices of network data were of size 1000000 by 34 for the first 12 csv files
that were exported, and the 13th csv file contained slightly fewer logs of data, meaning there
were slightly less than 13 million logs of data to iterate through. The 13 unique network data csv
files were read and concatenated into a singular data matrix, with the first four columns being
ignored, which was then z-Transformed and processed into an SVD the same way our subset
sample of data had been. The z-Transformation process is described later in section 5.4 of this
paper.
Using the first two singular values of the Σ matrix, every log in the concatenated csv files
were plotted by using the first two singular values of the Σ matrix as the x and y axis. The
columns of the csv files were also plotted by the same convention, using the first two singular
values of the Σ as the axis for plotting. The first two singular values were selected above the rest
because the results of the Σ matrix are returned in descending order, so the first two singular
values represent the two values that scale the U and V T unitary matrices of the SVD to recreate
the original matrix.
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Figure 5.1: Visual representation of the singular values of the first time slice of data. Singular
values appear in descending order due to the construction of the SVD and Σ [21].
The first two singular values were then multiplied by the U unitary matrix, returning a
vector of slightly less than 12 million rows by 2 columns in size. This was also done to the V T
unitary matrix, of which the results were transposed to be in the same form as the other product.
The columns of the two products of U and V T respectively were then separated into arrays, the
values were sent to lists, and the lists were then zipped together to create the data points that
would be plotted. Once the values for the U and V T by the first two singular values plots were
generated, they were produced with the results below.
The singular values by U graph displayed all logs within the concatenated matrix of all 13
network data csv files, which displays a somewhat linear relationship between the data, with
individual data points falling above and below a general trend line. The singular values by V T
graph displayed the columns of the concatenated matrix of all 13 network csv files, with each
point in the plot representing a different column. These columns were expected to be less linearly
dependent on one another than the log data, because the columns of the matrices represent the
features of each individual data point, where there was clearly disparity between many of the
logs and respective features.
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Figure 5.2: Singular Values by U. This displays a loose linear relationship between all data
points. The first two singular values were chosen to be the axes because those are the two most
dominant values to help predict other features of an individual log [21].
5.3 Robust Principal Component Analysis
Robust Principal Component Analysis (RPCA) is an adjusted statistical approach of PCA
which works with corrupted observations and outliers [28]. While PCA is susceptible to outliers
as previously stated, RPCA can detect a more accurate low dimensional space to be recovered,
and that is why RPCA is necessary over standard PCA for anomaly detection in the network data.
RPCA works to recover a low-rank matrix L and a sparse matrix S from corrupted measurements,
which in the case of network data would be the anomalies of the data set. Robust PCA works in
conjunction with the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) factorization method of separating
matrices into distinct unitary and diagonal matrices, giving an optimization problem as follows:
[28]
min(L,S)||L||∗+λ||S||1
subject to, |M− (L+S)| ≤ ε
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Figure 5.3: Singular Values by V T . The spareness of the plot shows how there is no apparent
linear relationship between the columns or features of the dataset [21]. This is logical because
features are linearly independent of each other. For example, IP addresses and ports do not depend
on each other.
In this equation, L is the low rank matrix which can be factorized as an SVD, ||L||∗ is the
nuclear norm of L (the sum of the singular values), λ is the coupling constant between L and S,
||S||1 is the sum of the entries S, and ε is the matrix of point-wise error constants that improve
the noise generated from real world data. Due to the nature of the network data, traditional PCA
would be too receptive to outliers and would prove to be ineffective and anomaly detection. As a
result, RPCA was the statistical method chosen for anomaly detection.
5.4 Z-Transform
Due to having various different types of information that were created through the feature
generation process, data normalization was necessary. Between the source and destination
ports, source and destination IP addresses, and averages that were calculated for when certain
IP addresses and ports came up throughout the dataset, a z-Transformation of the data was
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necessary as a preprocessing method before further analysis could be done. This was in each
column of the matrices that were generated, and was done by using the z-score statistical method.
[51]
z= (x−µ)
σ
For each column in the data set, the mean µ and standard deviations σ of a given column
were calculated. If the σ of a given column was not zero, each individual data point in the column
was taken, had the µ of the column subtracted from the given point, and that sum was then
divided by the σ of the total column. If the σ of a given column was zero, this would have resulted
in division by zero for all points in the column and would have produced NaNs (not a number),
denoting infinities and numbers that could not be read for further analysis. This was done for all
columns of data in the matrices that were generated, and these new z-Transformed matrices were
exported as new pandas dataframes for future use. After the z-Transformation was completed,
the new data matrix was evaluated as a numpy SVD (Singular Value Decomposition) to generate
the singular values of the z-Transformed data of the original given matrix.
5.5 λ
One of the most crucial variables to RPCA is λ, the coupling constant between the low
dimension L and S matrices, where L and S sum together to create the original matrix used for
analysis [28]. The L matrix in this case is an SVD of the non-anomalous data, and the S matrix is
a sparse matrix that represents the data points from the original matrix that are found by RPCA
to be anomalous. λ is the variable that differentiates what is considered anomalous, what is not,
and controls what is allowed into the S matrix. If λ is small, more data points will be allowed to
move from the L matrix to the S matrix, and as λ increases fewer data points will be considered
anomalous. The theoretical value of λ is equal to the following:
[47]
λ= 1√
max[m,n]
where m and n represent the rows and columns of the original matrix. For this project, λ
was altered from the default value in an attempt to improve the capabilities of RPCA in finding
anomalous entries within network data. This was done by changing the numerator value of one
to a integer variable, and then changing the variable many times to see the differences between
the L and S matrices as lambda was changed. This was done on a chosen small slice of data from
the network data set and was analyzed as a 5000 by 30 matrix. This equation can be seen below,
where H is the integer variable in change λ:
[47]
λ= H√
max[m,n]
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Figure 5.4: imShow visualizations. These four plots depict sparse S (anomaly) matrices that
change as the value of λ increases. This shows how the coupling constant alters which data points
are classified as anomaly and which are normal. As λ is increased the sparse matrices lose entries
in their matrices, thus the plots appear to have less data [47].
By using the matplotlib [29] imShow function, the following plots were produced to provide
visuals of how the entries in S were changing as λ was altered. A few examples of the imShow
plots can be seen below, where it can be seen that fewer entries appear in the S Matrix imShow
plots as the value of λ is increased.
5.6 µ and ρ
Two other variables used in RPCA are mu µ and rho ρ, which are used in the augmented
Lagrangian parameter that are used for convergence testing. The theoretical µ and ρ are taken
from The Augmented Lagrange Multiplier Method for Exact Recovery of Corrupted Low-Rank
Matrices [46] and are used in conjunction with given epsilon ε values to act as the stopping
criterion to help determine whether the RPCA code is converging based on the matrix it was
given. The default µ and ρ are respectively:
[46]
µ= 1||D||2
ρ = 1.2172+1.858ρs
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where, ρs = |Ω|mn
Where ||D||2 represents the spectral norm (largest singular value) of the given matrix D,
and ρs acts as the sampling density between ρ and ρs. For this project, µ and ρ were altered
from their default value in an attempt to improve the capabilities of RPCA and improve the
convergence rate of given matrices being tested. Two time slices were chosen from the network
data of size 5000 by 30 and 50000 by 526 respectively after features generation. The tables below
show how the convergence rate of a given matrix was changed after µ and ρ were changed, using
the theoretical λ value for all tests run. As seen in Figure 5.5 and 5.6, the µ and ρ values of 0.05
and 1.05 respectively greatly improved the number of iterations needed for RPCA to meet it’s
given stopping criterion. These values were deemed to be an improvement over the theoretical
values [46] as a result.
Figure 5.5: Initial µ and ρ testing
Figure 5.6: µ and ρ testing after feature generation
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5.7 Implementing RPCA
After tests were done on the first subset of data, a larger subset of data was chosen to test on.
The second subset of data contained network logs from the DDoS attack, and after ignoring the
non-discrete columns of the matrix the size was 50000 by 526. This matrix was z-Transformed
and factorized as an SVD, and its singular values were calculated accordingly [28]. However,
this matrix was also run through RPCA, which produced different singular values due to the
matrix being projected to a lower dimensional space. The matrix was decomposed into the form
M = L+S , where L=UΣV T is factorized as an SVD and S represents the sparse anomaly matrix
of the given matrix M [28]. The plots of the original singular values, the RPCA singular values,
and the imshow plot of the sparse anomaly S matrix, which depicts what cells are regarded as
anomalous, are shown in Figures 5.7. 5.8, and 5.9.
Figure 5.7: Singular values of new time slice [21].
32
5.7. IMPLEMENTING RPCA
Figure 5.8: Singular values of S matrix from RPCA [21]. This plot has a steep downward trend
which is due to the S matrix being sparse and therefore having few entries greater than 0. The
result of this is a matrix that has very few dominant singular values which influences the data
points in the anomaly matrix [28].
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Figure 5.9: S matrix imShow plot after RPCA. Visualize representation of anomaly S matrix.
The spareness of this results in few data points being represented in this plot [28].
After the manager, described in section 4.5 (Feature Infrastructure) was fully set up, mathe-
matical analysis tests became much easier to run for different feature sets and time slices from
the network data, as well as λ, µ, and ρ value tests for RPCA. This manager allowed editing
capabilities in the terminal using the nano command for parameters in RPCA, changing the
range of network log data to be analyzed, and streamlined the process for joining the results of
an anomalous S matrix with the ground truth of the network data. However, before the results
of these S matrices could be compared with the ground truth information, the entries of the S
matrix needed to be reverse z-Transformed to de-normalize the data back to the original relative
scales it entered with. This process was the reverse of the normalization method of the z-score in
Section 5.4 (z-Transform), where all columns of the S matrix underwent the following:
[4]
x= zσ+µ
where z is the z-Transformed value of each cell in the column, and σ and µ respectively repre-
sent the standard deviation and mean of the given column. Similar to the forward z-Transform
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performed earlier, if the σ of a column was 0, the column was skipped over in the reverse z-
Transform process since it would not have been normalized in the first place. The data in these
columns would be of the same relevant scale as it was when it entered the iterative process.
If the value of σ was not zero, the entries in that column went through the above process and
returned to their original relative scale to be compared with the ground truth network data. After
the reverse z-Transformation was completed for every column in the S matrix, the new reverse
anomaly matrix was joined with the ground truth network data for cross validation purposes.
5.8 λ Tests
Once preprocessing had been done to properly reverse z-Transform our S matrices and cross
validated them with the ground truth network data, tests were run on a select number of time
slices for the features that had been generated. For the time slices described above in chapter 2,
ten different λ values were tested, and the number of iterations to convergence was record for
each test run. For each test, the non reverse z-Transformed S matrix, the reverse z-Transformed
S matrix, and the joined S matrix were all exported as csv files. The table below depicts the
results of the tests run on these four time slices:
[47]
λ= H√
max[m,n]
H Time Slice 1 Time Slice 2 Time Slice 3 Time Slice 4
Lambda 1 1 1000+ 28 20 1000+
Lambda 2 1.2 1000+ 29 28 1000+
Lambda 3 1.4 108 29 34 1000+
Lambda 4 1.6 1000+ 26 83 1000+
Lambda 5 1.8 1000+ 24 49 1000+
Lambda 6 2 1000+ 25 37 1000+
Lambda 7 2.2 1000+ 26 352 1000+
Lambda 8 2.4 1000+ 27 183 1000+
Lambda 9 2.6 1000+ 26 89 1000+
Lambda 10 2.8 1000+ 25 38 1000+
Table 5.1: Initial λ Testing
As described in Section 4.1 (λ), λ acts as the coupling constant between returned the low
dimensional L matrix and sparse anomalous S matrix from RPCA, where the two matrices
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combine to create the original matrix M. In all of these tests, the default values for µ and ρ
from Lin-Chen-Ma [46] were used, as these tests attempted to examine the parameter λ and
its relation to anomaly detection. As the integer value H was increased, the value of λ did not
linearly impact the number of iterations required for convergence of RPCA, but the entries of S
changed between each λ tested.
5.9 Training Set
These 40 tests were done to experiment with viability of the manager for future tests with
different times slices. After the tests were completed, two additional sets of features were
generated as highlighted in chapter 6, and three time slices were chosen as the training set
of the network data. The feature sets are denoted originalFeatures, sipdipIndividualColumns,
and sipDipIn. Similar to the original 40 tests that were run, the default values for µ and ρ
from Lin-Chen-Ma [46] were used, as these tests attempted to examine the parameter λ and its
relation to anomaly detection. For each test, the non reverse z-Transformed S Matrix, the reverse
z-Transformed S Matrix, and the joined S Matrix were all exported as csv files, and the resulting
tables show the results of the 90 tests run [47]:
Original H Time Slice 1 Time Slice 2 Time Slice 3
Lambda 1 1 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 2 1.2 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 3 1.4 108 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 4 1.6 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 5 1.8 1000+ 25 1000+
Lambda 6 2 1000+ 25 1000+
Lambda 7 2.2 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 8 2.4 1000+ 36 228
Lambda 9 2.6 1000+ 47 1000+
Lambda 10 2.8 1000+ 53 133
Table 5.2: Lambda Testing with Original feature set
SipDipIndividual H Time Slice 1 Time Slice 2 Time Slice 3
Lambda 1 1 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 2 1.2 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
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Lambda 3 1.4 188 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 4 1.6 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 5 1.8 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 6 2 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 7 2.2 1000+ 33 1000+
Lambda 8 2.4 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 9 2.6 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 10 2.8 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Table 5.3: Lambda Testing with AFC individual columns feature set
SipDipIn H Time Slice 1 Time Slice 2 Time Slice 3
Lambda 1 1 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 2 1.2 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 3 1.4 108 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 4 1.6 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 5 1.8 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 6 2 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 7 2.2 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 8 2.4 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 9 2.6 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 10 2.8 193 1000+ 1000+
Table 5.4: Lambda Testing with inside and outside feature set
For each joined S Matrix that was exported throughout this process that was compared with
ground truth network data for cross validation, confusion matrices were produced to compare the
True Positive, False Positive, True Negative, and False Negative results of our anomaly detection,
where positive and negative results represented anomalous and non-anomalous data respectively.
The results of these confusion matrices can be seen in chapter 7, where the increase in the value
of λ coincided with better anomaly detection results for finding True Negatives and eliminating
False Positives. In the next chapter, we focus on interpreting these results to help data analysts
prevent attacks.
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MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND
By Guth
Attempting to find anomalies required advanced statistical approaches and a high level
understanding of how to do so. In this section, background information on dimension reduction
algorithms will be presented.
6.1 PCA
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a supervised learning algorithm that can be used for
many different analyses of data [79]. PCA can extract the most significant information from a
given data set, make data easier to work with by simplify it, and compress the data to a lower
subspace by dimension reduction [79]. For this report, our data from the VAST 2011 Challenge
can be represented as described in section 5.1, where M ∈Rm×n can be broken down as follows: [26]
M =UΣV T
where U ∈Rm×n is unitary, Σ ∈Rn×n is a diagonal matrix whose entries (σ) are the singular
values of M, and V T ∈Rn×n is unitary [79]. The singular values of M can be used to compute Mˆ, a
low dimensional projection of M such that Mˆ ∈Rk×n, where k ∈R and k < m. Dimension reduction
therefore produces a matrix Mˆ from a matrix M, where there are fewer features than the original
data set. This matrix Mˆ retains the significant information from the original matrix, and can be
represented to rewrite M as Mˆ as follows [79]:
Mˆ = ΣˆV T
In this case, Σˆ is computed by reducing the m-k smallest singular values σi ∈ Σˆ to 0 such that
only the k largest singular values remain, and V T remains the same matrix from the factorization
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of M. Therefore, Σˆ ∈Rm×n, V T ∈Rn×n, and the matrices produce Mˆ ∈Rm×n. Since Σˆ has the m-k
smallest features as 0, the m-k features of Mˆ are also 0. Therefore, the m-k features can be
removed from the matrices, and Mˆ ∈ Rk×n. This new Mˆ is a low dimensional projection of the
original matrix M.
It has been shown that any real or complex matrix M can be factorized into a product of
the matrices U, Σ, and V T , and therefore any M can be turned into a new matrix Mˆ by means
of dimension reduction. For real-world data that exists in an m-dimensional space, every data
point often exists within a lower dimensional subspace of the original data space. When this
occurs, there will be several singular values of the original data set that are close to or equal to
0. A singular value close to or equal to 0 designates that a feature of the original data set can
be predicted by a linear combination of other features. These smallest singular values can be
reduced to 0 in the same way that Σˆ was computed, which results in a reduced data set (Mˆ in the
previous case) where the most significant information is retained, since the eliminated features
can be predicted from the remaining, more important features.
These singular values close to or equal to 0 often occur in real-world data because real-world
data is never truly random. Truly random matrices containing elements between 0 and 1 would
have data dispersed between the m-dimensions of the data set, and would contain singular
values not close to 0. Therefore, truly randomly dispersed data cannot be reduced to a lower
dimension. However, real-world data can often times be reduced to lower dimensions [47]. When
singular values are close to or equal to 0, eliminating these values for dimension reduction
becomes trivial, but deciding on what σi values are small enough to remove is nontrivial. The
problem of deciding which singular values to eliminate becomes dependent of the type of and
features of the given data. The number (k) of singular values retained are decided based on the
percent of information that needs to be retained to evaluate the data. For example, if a problem
required that 95% of the data be preserved, then only 95% of the singular values would be
retained, summing individual σi from largest to smallest until k singular values were kept. The
remaining m-k σi would be eliminated once this 95% threshold was met with the k largest sin-
gular values. This is further explained with the equation below, where the given matrix M ∈Rm×n:
k∑
i=1
σi = (0.95)
min(m,n)∑
i=1
σi
Once the m-k singular values have been reduced to 0 and eliminated, Σˆ may be created. The
corresponding rows and columns of zero’s on the diagonal of Σˆ would be 0 in Mˆ when dimension
reduction is applied. Finally, this new Mˆ would retain 95% of the variance from the original
matrix M, while being in a lower dimension.
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Figure 6.1: This figure provides an example of PCA dimension reduction. The data points above
are from a subset of data with no attacks or anomalies. The data appears to fit into a 2-dimensional
subspace, even though the data exists in a 3-dimensional space. By using PCA, the majority of the
data, the green points, can be reduced to a new 2-dimensional subspace. Once this new subspace is
produced, the green points have a very low error margin between one another. The red data points,
which exit outside of the new 2-dimensional subspace, are determined to be anomalous, as they lie
outside of the majority of the data set. Note: this image is an example of PCA dimension reduction,
was not a part of this project, and the true data lies in a much higher dimensional space. [55]
6.2 Alternative PCA
While SVD is the more traditional approach to PCA, another approach will eventually become
important and play a role in this report. Eckart and Young proved in their report from 1936
that there is a slightly different approach to the SVD matrix factorization highlighted previously
in this report [31]. The optimization problem discussed was a previous method for PCA, and is
centered around a minimization problem as opposed to the more standard SVD approach. The
same matrix M ∈ Rm×n is assumed in this equation. The rows of M represent the firewall logs
from the VAST Challenge 2011 data set, and the columns represent the features generated for
each firewall log. The goal of this minimization problem is to find the k largest singular values
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Figure 6.2: This figure provides an example of data in a 3-dimensional space that cannot be
reduced to a lower dimension, showing that truly random data cannot be projected to a lower
subspace. [55]
for a given data set such that a k-dimension subspace can be found for M, where the important
information is retained. To compute this k-dimensional subspace of M, the minimization equation
below is computed:
min
L
||L−Y ||2F
subject to, ρ(L)< k
where L ∈Rm×n, ||L−Y ||2F is the Frobenius Norm of L-Y (the sum of the squares of entries of
L-Y), and ρ(L) is the rank of L (the number of nonzero singular values in L) [31]. This approach
attempts to minimize the error between the data points of the original matrix, and the projected
data points in the lower dimensional subspace to preserve accuracy. This approach provides
structure to improve PCA and eventually create Robust Principal Component Analysis, the
dimension reduction approach used in this report.
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6.3 RPCA
Robust Principal Component Analysis (RPCA) is an adjusted version of PCA. While both
PCA and RPCA are dimension reduction approaches, PCA is susceptible to outliers, and RPCA
can detect a more accurate low dimensional subspace for recovery. The figure 6.2 shown above
depicting a truly random data set would be more difficult for PCA to handle than RPCA. The
sensitivity of PCA to outliers cannot be fixed be by altering the value of k (the largest singular
values of a given matrix). Every σi would be changed by a single outlier in PCA due to how brittle
the algorithm is. For a given data set, a single outlier could change the size of singular values
that were close to 0 to arbitrarily large. Due to the nature of the network data, PCA would be
too receptive to outliers and would prove to be ineffective. This is why RPCA was necessary over
standard PCA for this report.
RPCA works to recover a low-rank matrix L and a sparse matrix S whose entries are the
outliers of a given matrix M. This problem is solved without knowing k (the dimension of L), or
the locations of the nonzero outlier entries in S. In 2011, an approach for solving RPCA was found
by Candes, Li, Ma, and Wright [22] which inspired us to consider their work in this report. This
approach is as follows:
min
L,S
ρ(L)+λ||S||0
subject to, |M− (L+S)| = 0
where L is a low-rank matrix, ρ(L) is the rank of L, λ is the coupling constant (trade off
between L and S), and ||S||0 is the number of nonzero entries in S (the outliers of the given matrix
M) [22]. While this approach would solve for L and S without knowing the value of k or the
location of the outliers in S, this problem has no closed form solution. In addition to this, a brute
force attempt to solve this problem would be exponentially hard. Additional requirements for
solving the RPCA approach above were discovered from the 2011 paper [22]. If a few additional
requirements are introduced, the above approach becomes solvable. These requirements are as
follows:
• ρ(L) is reasonably small
• S is fairly sparse
• The nonzero entries of S are randomly distributed
• The columns of L are incoherent and far from the standard basis
These requirements help create a solvable minimization problem when applied to real-world
data. When these requirements are met, a solvable RPCA equation that recovers L and S can be
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made [55]:
min
L,S
||L||∗+λ||S||1
subject to, |M− (L+S)| ¹ ε
In this equation, ||L||∗ is the nuclear norm of L (the sum of the singular values of L), ||S||1 is
the sum of the entries of S, λ is the coupling constant between L and S, and ε is a matrix of the
same size as M, whose entries are the set of point-wise error constraints to adjust for noise from
real-world data. For the purposes of this project, ε was set to 0 to. The theoretical best value of λ
was found to be:
λ= 1√
max[m,n]
where m and n are the dimensions of the given matrix M [22]. This λ recovers the low-rank
matrix L and the sparse matrix S, but does not guarantee that the outliers recovered are the
anomalies in our data set. λ determines which entries are allowed to pass between L and S, and
therefore determines what entries are considered outliers, or anomalies in our case. If λ is too
small, then many entries are allowed in S and outliers can be falsely identified. As λ increases,
fewer entries are allowed into S, and eventually no entries are allowed into the sparse S matrix,
denoting 0 outliers in the given original matrix M. Therefore, the value of λ needed to be altered
and changed for the purposes of this project, in an attempt to optimize the anomaly detection
capabilities of RPCA and correctly predict the anomalous firewall logs in the VAST Challenge
2011 data set.
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Figure 6.3: The figure provides an example of RPCA dimension reduction. The given data is
the same as the previous example, a subset of data existing in a 3-dimensional space. Similar to
the previous example, an implementation of PCA would result in a new 2-dimensional subspace
in the green plane. However, the majority of the data appears to fit a 1-dimensional subspace,
even though the given data exists in a 3-dimensional space. RPCA is robust to outliers, and could
detect a lower 1-dimensional subspace on which the majority of the data lied. The red data points
are regarded as anomalous by both PCA and RPCA in this example, however RPCA was able to
recognize purple data points as slightly anomalous in this new 1-dimensional subspace. This is an
example of how RPCA is more effective at dimension reduction than PCA. Note: this image is an
example of RPCA dimension reduction, was not a part of this project, and the true data lies in a
much higher dimensional space. [55]
6.4 Lagrange Multiplier
We define the locations of the entries observed (sampling density) in a given matrix M with
Ω, where the entries m are such that (i, j) ∈Ω if Mi j is observed. We also define the operator
PΩ, where PΩ(M) is the projection of M onto the set Ω. Given that condition have been met, we
recover the low-rank matrix L using the minimization described in RPCA to give the following:
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min ||L||∗, s.t.L i j =Mi j, (i, j) ∈Ω
where ‖|L||∗ is the nuclear norm discussed previously (the sum of the singular values of a
given matrix M). Solving the RPCA minimization problem discussed previously requires certain
criterion to be met, and our method for this algorithm is based off of using augmented Lagrange
multipliers (ALM) [46]. Lagrangian multipliers are a technique used in solving optimization
problems, specifically finding minimas and maximas subject to an equality constraint [46]. This
method is useful in solving a difficult optimization problem because it allows the relaxation of
a problem constraint, which in our case is the entries observed in our given matrix M. For our
purposes of finding anomalies in our data set, we required a way to expedite the run time of
RPCA, and applied the Augmented Lagrange Multiplier Method given by the following [46]:
Lˆ(L,S,Y )= ||L||∗+λ||S||1+〈Y , M−L−S〉+ µ2 ||M−L−S||
2
F
To solve, the Lagrangian Lˆ is minimized with respect to L (with S fixed), and then Lˆ is
minimized w.r.t. S (with L fixed). Then, the Lagrangian Multiplier Y is revised with the constraint
errors. This method is referred to as the Alternating Directions Method of Multipliers (ADMM)
[46]. When attempting to use this ADMM approach, the parameters µ and ρ must be considered.
We have that µ is directly present in the ADMM problem above, and while ρ is not directly seen,
it is still an important parameter in the algorithm. These two parameters impact the number of
iterations RPCA will take to converge and terminate, where µ=µρ and µ increases after each
iteration of our algorithm. For the purposes of this project, µ and ρ were altered and changed in
an attempt to improve the rate of convergence of RPCA as we attempted to find anomalies in the
VAST Challenge 2011 data set.
An empirical analysis of the impact the parameters µ and ρ have in the convergence of RPCA
was a dominant aspect of this project. Slightly modifying either parameter could produce a vastly
different version of the algorithm, with improved or worsened results compared to the theoretical
values provided [46]. As the values of µ and ρ reduced the number of iterations necessary for
our algorithm to converge, the potential for faster tests to be run greatly increased, along with
the ability to solve larger, more complex problems. µ represents the coefficient that is added to
the constraint of our problem. When µ is small, the constraint term is small, and the focus of
the minimization problem shifts to the target terms. Conversely, when µ is large, the constraint
term is large, and the focus on the minimization problem becomes the constraint term itself. To
solve this problem efficiently, there needs to be a balance between the constraint and objective
terms. One term dominating the other will make the optimization problem difficult to solve, and
µ being too large or small could adversely affect the possibilities of meeting the given constraint
and objective terms.
As is highlighted in literature, here is no fixed value of µ that guarantees optimal conver-
gence. Therefore, µ has the ability to be altered and changed at each iteration of the problem if
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necessary. Since our algorithm may be solved with a small µ when the objective term reaches its
intermediate value, µ may be increased to focus on satisfying the constraint term. This is where
ρ comes into play, and the process for updating µ and ρ is as follows [46]:
µk+1 =
ρµk if µ||L0−LΩ−S||F /||M||F < ²2µk otherwise
where ²2 is a chosen stopping criterion. In this case, ρ is greater than 1, as anything less
than 1 would prevent the algorithm from solving. The theoretical values for µ and ρ are given as
follows [46]:
µ= 1
σM
ρ = 1.2172+1.8588ρs
where, ρs = |Ω|mn
where the relationship between ρ and ρs is found through regression [46]. Provided that
one of µ and ρ is using the exact ALM method described previously, these values guarantee the
algorithm will converge. Unfortunately, we are not using an exact version, and we do not fully
update the estimates of L and S at each iteration of our algorithm. In this inexact approach,
convergence is not guaranteed, and the theory fails as a result. This is why µ and ρ where
crucially important to this project, because changing and altering these parameters would better
help us understand how to improve the rate of convergence for our algorithm.
As mentioned above, ²2 is one of the two stopping criterion for our algorithm, the other being
²1. For our algorithm to converge, there needs to come a point where, since the last iteration, the
changes to our constraint and objective are not significant enough to continue making updates,
such that both criterion of our problem are satisfied. The theoretical values are given from the
same paper as µ and ρ and are as follows: [46]
||M−LΩ−S||F
||M||F
< ²1
min
µk,
p
µk
||Lk−Lk−1−S||F
||M||F
< ²2
Here, ²1 and ²2 criterion represent the constraint and objective of our problem, respectively.
If both of these inequalities are satisfied, the algorithm will stop, signifying that convergence
has occurred for our problem. Therefore, if either ² values are changed, the number of iterations
needed for convergence will change. An increase in ²1 would cause the constraint to be less
satisfied. An increase in ²2 would cause the objective to experience less minimization progress
between iterations, causing expedited convergence. Therefore, smaller ² values ensure a higher
rate of convergence, as even slight changes between iterations cause the algorithm to continue
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running. This gives an explanation for how the ADMM method approach from [46] was used in
this project, and how µ and ρ are updated as RPCA attempts to converge. Updating and changing
the theoretical µ and ρ taken from [46] was a crucial part of this project, as the convergence
rate of RPCA needed to be increased for a larger number of tests to be run in hopes of finding
anomalies in our data set.
6.5 Mathematical Implications
Given the variables λ, µ, and ρ, various experiments were done to both pick a value of λ that
would correctly find all anomalies within a given subset of firewall logs, and a combination of
µ and ρ that would minimize the number of iterations needed for our algorithm to converge,
allowing tests to be run faster than with the theoretical values of these variables presented in
Lin-Chen-Ma.
6.5.1 λ
Changing the value of λ from the theoretical one [46] as discussed in section 5.5 was necessary
for improving the anomaly detection capabilities of RPCA. By changing the numerator of the
theoretical λ from a 1 to H, the opportunity to manually change the coupling constant between
the L and S matrices was made possible, allowing for several experiments to be conducted for
anomaly detection. To find the anomalies in the VAST Challenge 2011 data set, padded subsets
of firewall logs containing the three types of attacks in the data set (distributed denial of service
(DDos), socially engineered, and undocumented computer) were chosen to perform experiments
on to test the anomaly detection capabilities of RPCA.
Once the theoretical value of λ was tested on each subset of firewall logs with each feature set
described in chapter 4, the value of H was increased by 0.2 for each new value of λ used to find
anomalies in a given experiment. This process was executed until λ had gradually been increased
to 9.8, meaning 100 different values of λ had been tested for each subset of firewall logs for each
feature set for a total of 450 λ experiments on the data set. As previously mentioned, to compare
the results of each λ experiment confusion matrices comparing the number of True Positives,
False Positives, True Negatives, and False Negatives were produced. In these experiments,
Positive and Negative results respectfully implied an anomalous and non-anomalous entry in
our subsets. The goal of these experiments was find values of λ for each subset of firewall logs
and feature set combination that would produce a confusion matrix containing the following: all
True Positives of the subset (the anomalies in the data), all True Negatives of the subset (the
normal entries in the data), and no False Negatives (a firewall log that had been predicted as
non-anomalous but in actuality was). False Positives in these experiments represented data that
had been predicted as anomalous but in actuality was not.
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When confusion matrices were computed for experiments using the theoretical value of λ,
there were many False Positives and False Negatives that appeared across each subset of fire-
wall logs and feature set combination. As λ was gradually increased as more experiments were
conducted, the majority of False Negatives were eliminated and False Positives were converted
to True Negatives, as fewer entries were allowed into the S matrix due to the increase of the
coupling constant between L and S. Examples of confusion matrices that were produced from
the experiments that were run can be seen below in chapter 7, where the best subset of firewall
logs and feature set combination results came from the undocumented computer attack subset
with the AFC Network IP Addresses Inside and Outside feature set. The progression of confusion
matrices can be seen below, where as λ increased False Positives were eliminated and became
True Negatives:
Theoretical λ (H = 1.0)
True False
Positive 4 388
Negative 585 0
Increased λ (H = 2.0)
True False
Positive 4 82
Negative 901 0
Best λ (H = 9.8)
True False
Positive 4 2
Negative 981 0
Table 6.1: Confusion matrices of undocumented computer attack with inside and outside Features
In the last λ experiment confusion matrix shown, all True Positives are recorded, and only 2
False Negatives remain. When testing for statistical accuracy in an experiment, the following
calculation is performed: [12]
Accuracy= TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
where our Accuracy for this confusion matrix is 99.8%. However, statistical accuracy can
misrepresent the results of a given experiment [75], and the F1 score is regarded as a superior
measure of an experiment’s accuracy. The F1 score is a value from 0 to 1 that is referred to as the
harmonic mean of precision and recall, and is defined as follows: [75]
F1 = 2∗ precision∗ recallprecision+ recall
where, precision= TPTP+FP
where, recall = TPTP+FN
Here, our F1 score comes out to 0.80 due to the 2 False Positives that are still recognized
in the experiment with the given λ value. This shows that, while it may appear the confusion
matrix results from the best λ value are very good, that the 2 False Positives leave the results
as only okay compared to having a perfect F1 score of 1 [75]. Similar to the tests run for µ and
ρ, this value of λ for the above subset of firewall logs and feature set combination is a local
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result, and would not guarantee good results for a different subset of firewall logs and feature
set combination. However, as False Positives were eliminated as λ was gradually increased,
eventually all False Positives will be eliminated when an optimal value of λ is found for a given
subset of firewall logs. This means that there exists an optimal value of λ for each subset of
firewall logs in the data set for which a perfect F1 score of 1 and corresponding confusion matrix
can be found.
6.5.2 µ and ρ
For finding optimal values of µ and ρ to improve the rate of convergence of RPCA, several
value combinations were tested on various subsets of firewall logs, as highlighted in section 5.6.
The goal of these experiments was to find values of µ and ρ for the global data set, meaning to
find µ and ρ values that would improve the rate of convergence for any subset of firewall logs
in the VAST Challenge 2011 data set. With every iteration that occured while RPCA attempted
to converge, the estimated L and S matrices slightly changed. Our maximum iteration count
was set to 1000 for convergence, because if the ²1 and ²2 criterion were not satisfied after that
many iterations, the algorithm had the potential to not converge and continue on to ∞ [46]. Any
experiment that was stopped once it reached 1000 iterations was denoted as 1000+, due to the
unknown number of iterations necessary for RPCA to converge with the chosen µ and ρ values.
Therefore, if the chosen µ and ρ did not cause the algorithm to converge within 1000 iterations,
the experiment would stop and the µ and ρ would be deemed a failure at improving the rate of
convergence of RPCA.
Once the values of ²1 and ²2 were set, using the theoretical values provided by Lin-Chen-Ma,
the problem became picking µ and ρ combinations that would satisfy both the criterion, and work
for any given matrix (any subset of firewall logs in our case). As shown in section 5.6, several
µ and ρ values were tested on subsets of firewall logs that contained a distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attack, where an increase in µ lead to an increase in the constraint term in the
Lagrangian. At this point, it looked as though the µ and ρ values of 0.05 and 1.05, respectively,
were promising.
Unfortunately, when using these µ and ρ values while tested other subsets of firewall logs
for convergence of RPCA, using the theoretical value of λ [46], including subsets containing
socially engineered and undocumented computer attacks, the values of µ and ρ did not produce
the desired results. In fact, the µ and ρ values of 0.05 and 1.05, respectively, caused many
experiments to run for 1000 iterations, meaning the µ and ρ were very bad values for the given
subsets of firewall logs. Therefore, the µ and ρ values of 0.05 and 1.05 were determined to be
local results for the original subsets of firewall logs they were tested on. While these µ and ρ did
improve the rate of convergence of RPCA for the original subset of firewall logs they were tested
on, this combination failed to improve the rate of convergence of RPCA when tested on other
subsets of firewall logs containing different types of attacks. This led the µ and ρ combination of
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0.05 and 1.05 to be determined as inadmissible and inconclusive for the global data set, as these
values did not cause an improved rate of convergence for RPCA.
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RESULTS
By Guth, Sola, and Velarde
7.1 µ and ρ
As discussed in chapter 5 section 6 (µ and ρ), the default values for the RPCA parameters µ
and ρ, defined in Lin-Chen-Ma, were altered in this project in an attempt to improve the rate of
convergence for anomaly detection. The tables in chapter 5 show how RPCA fared when µ and
ρ were set to their default values, and as a means of comparing the default values with those
calculated in chapter 5 section 6, the same 90 tests were run on the same feature sets and time
slices described in chapter 4. The values of µ and ρ were set to 0.05 and 1.05, respectively, and
the results of the new µ and ρ values are shown in the tables below:
OriginalFeatures H Time Slice 1 Time Slice 2 Time Slice 3
Lambda 1 1 1000+ 90 1000+
Lambda 2 1.2 1000+ 89 1000+
Lambda 3 1.4 302 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 4 1.6 1000+ 417 1000+
Lambda 5 1.8 1000+ 491 1000+
Lambda 6 2 1000+ 495 1000+
Lambda 7 2.2 304+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 8 2.4 1000+ 160 1000+
Lambda 9 2.6 1000+ 155 1000+
Lambda 10 2.8 1000+ 174 1000+
Table 7.1: µ and ρ testing on the original individual column IP address feature
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SipDipIndividual H Time Slice 1 Time Slice 2 Time Slice 3
Lambda 1 1 141 81 1000+
Lambda 2 1.2 1000+ 85 1000+
Lambda 3 1.4 143 150 1000+
Lambda 4 1.6 148 285 1000+
Lambda 5 1.8 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 6 2 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 7 2.2 304 329 1000+
Lambda 8 2.4 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 9 2.6 1000+ 129 1000+
Lambda 10 2.8 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Table 7.2: µ and ρ testing on AFC’s individual column IP address feature
SipDipIn H Time Slice 1 Time Slice 2 Time Slice 3
Lambda 1 1 1000+ 77 1000+
Lambda 2 1.2 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 3 1.4 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 4 1.6 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 5 1.8 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 6 2 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 7 2.2 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 8 2.4 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 9 2.6 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
Lambda 10 2.8 454 1000+ 1000+
Table 7.3: µ and ρ testing on inside and outside features
The changed µ and ρ values only slightly altered the number of iterations for the third
feature set (sipDipIn) for all ten λ values that were tested. However, for the second feature set
(sipdipIndividualColumns) there was noticeable improvement between the default µ and ρ values
from Lin-Chen-Ma and the ones tested in this project, particularly in the DDoS and rdp time
slices.
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7.2 λ
The coupling constant ρ was prominent throughout this project, acting as the parameter that
allowed experimentation with different S matrices to improve the anomaly detection capabilities
of RPCA. As stated in chapter 5, the tests that were run on our three Feature Sets and three
Time Slices, using ten λ values per combination, produced 90 unique joined S matrices for us to
compare to the ground truth network data. Confusion matrices, as explained in chapter 5 section
9, were produced to determine the rate of success for detecting anomalies within the network
data, of which the best results can be seen below for each unique Time Slice.
7.3 Final Features
To help with the final selection of our features, we created a confusion matrix for each type of
attack and specific time time slice for each of our IP addresses choices. These confusion matrices
are produced using the S matrix from the output of RPCA. As explained in chapter 4, we chose to
create a feature for every distinct port, similar to the first iteration of our IP address feature set.
An important note, is that after much deliberation, we realized that our destination port feature
that listed each port below 1024 was causing several false positives, and we decided to omit it
during the creation of these confusion matrices. Given more time we would have created more
iterations of different port feature set in order to avoid omitting the S values in the resulting
confusion matrices.
7.3.1 Detecting Denial of Service Attack
As explained in chapter 2, DDoS attacks occur when one machine attempts to disrupt services
through means of enormous amounts of calls to a network. The VAST dataset challenge outlines
this attack in the solution manual. The attack occurred on the first day of the dataset, April
13th, 2011 at 11:39:00 and ended at 12:51:00 that same day. The time slice chosen for this attack
was from 11:33:47 to 11:39:57, which accounted for roughly one minute of the attack. This slice
ensures that we have enough log data that is considered normal and enough data that is out of
the ordinary and can be malicious. As with the other attack results, we ran the time slice and
tested three different feature sets and produced confusion matrices for each run cycle. In order to
help us solidify our feature choices.
Original Features
True False
Positive 145 841
Negative 0 644
AFC Columns
True False
Positive 145 841
Negative 0 644
Inside and Outside Ranges
True False
Positive 145 226
Negative 615 644
Table 7.4: Confusion Matrices of Original Features for DDoS
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From the tables above, we see that the first two feature sets functioned the same and returned
the same results. The reasoning for this is that this time slice is relatively small and as a result
of the nature of the two feature sets they created similar feature matrices. The first set has a
distinct column for each IP address and the second has a column for each feature in the AFC
network and two columns for any outside source or destination IP addresses. As stated before,
this time slice is small relative to the data set and may only include one IP address that is outside
of AFC’s network and as a result, would create a nearly identical feature matrix.
The third feature set, however yields different results. With this set there were the same
number of true positives but it also detects 615 true negatives. This eliminates several of the
false positives that the other two feature sets included. There are still however, the same number
of false negatives. This could be a result of the time slice being too small and not having enough
rows to accurately determine what is a true negative and what is a false negative. Regardless, we
see an increase in correct results with the third feature set. Therefore it is determined that the
third feature set is more accurate in detecting denial of service attacks.
7.3.2 Detecting Socially Engineered Attack
A socially engineered attack occurs when humans curiosity are to enable malicious activity.
In the solutions manual, a socially engineered attack that results in an unauthorized remote
desktop protocol begins on April 14th, 2011 13:31. As stated in chapter 2, this attack comes from
a computer that is outside of AFC’s network and uses the common port 3389 in order to make the
unauthorized connection that can be used to harm AFC’s network. This port is among security
concern ports we examined since in the past several companies have been victimized by this
exploit. For a full table of ports examines in this feature and reasons why, refer to the ports
section in chapter 4. Similar to before, we chose another time slice to have a proof of concept that
our feature functions properly. Our time slice begins at April 14th, 2011 at 13:30:55 and ends at
13:32:00 a few minutes after. Again, below are the confusion matrices for our three main feature
sets.
Original Features
True False
Positive 2 5506
Negative 0 0
AFC Columns
True False
Positive 2 300
Negative 5206 0
Inside and Outside Ranges
True False
Positive 2 236
Negative 5270 0
Table 7.5: Confusion Matrices of AFC individual column Features
For detecting attacks that can happen among ports, our features were progressively more
accurate. In the first feature set we detect the attack; however, there are an unacceptable amount
of false positives. These false positives most likely are derived from the amount of IP addresses it
detected as anomalous. The second feature set had much more true negatives rather than false
positives. This feature set was much more accurate at determining what was an attack and what
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was considered in the realm of normal in the slice. Finally, the last set was the most accurate
with finding attacks and reducing the amount of false positives. Again, the third feature set gives
us more reasoning for choosing it into our final feature library.
Although false positives are not as critical as false negatives, a good anomaly detection system
should reduce that amount of false positives wherever possible. Our third feature set does this,
and with this time slice it achieved a 95.7% success rate at determining anomalous behavior.
7.3.3 Detecting Undocumented Computer Attack
As mentioned in the previous sections, we ran three different set of features for detecting the
undocumented computer attack. The time slice chosen for this feature was from April 15th, 2011
14:05:00 to April 15th, 2011 14:08:00. The feature which detected the undocumented computer
relied on knowledge of the system architecture that the company outlined in the VAST dataset
description. This helped outline how critical it is to consider the security contracts a company
has in place while detecting attacks. Violation of these rules are an indication that something in
the system is off, or that an employee does not understand them clearly. In this particular time
slice, there were two features that highlighted the undocumented computer attack within our
three features.
The Original and SIP and DIP individual columns features identified computers that breached
the security contract. However, the column that identified each unique IP address highlighted
every row in the S matrix as an anomaly. This signaled that this feature was the wrong data for
RPCA since every point was considered an outlier. The source IP and destination IP feature that
classified an IP address as inside or outside the contract significantly decreased the amount of
false negatives, while still being able to find the attack.
Original Features
True False
Positive 4 983
Negative 0 0
AFC Columns
True False
Positive 4 983
Negative 0 0
Inside and Outside Ranges
True False
Positive 4 2
Negative 981 0
Table 7.6: Confusion matrices of inside and outside Features
In summary, we believe that detecting an undocumented computer attack depends upon a
security contract that must be established by the company. Overly describing the network caused
issues because every IP address was unique enough to cause RPCA to evaluate them as an
anomaly. Even though it accurately describes the data, it had adverse consequences – similarly to
the effect of using a timestamp as a feature. This pattern shows promise towards future analysts
as learning the specific domain of their company can be used to generate features.
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7.4 Case Study: Reducing Number of False Positives
One of the dilemmas regarding our security concert port, was the sheer number of false
positives that it could generate. How does an analyst distinguish between a port that can be
used for a daily function to when that port is being exploited? What can characterize an attack
differently than its proper use?
We investigated using AFC’s Network on top of the security concern port to capture the idea
that an exploited port would most likely come from outside the internal network. This helps
us distinguish workers using a port for a task, such as transferring files, to an external user
attempting to exploit it, such as steal information from the file system. With this in mind, we
only considered a port as concerning if either the destination or source port is not in the expected
network.
SIP and DIP Ranges
True False
Positive 145 226
Negative 615 644
AFC and Port Join Feature
True False
Positive 145 155
Negative 686 644
Table 7.7: The table to the right shows a decrease in false positive due to considering ports that
are used commonly but can be used maliciously
As shown in the above tables, the number of false positives for this slice was reduced by 5%.
In a bigger time slice, this could significantly impact the number of concerns that the security
analyst needs to be aware of. This emphasizes that there is a need to have a structured security
contract that can be applied to customize features that will describe the system.
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PROTOTYPE TO EXPLORE AND EVALUATE ANOMALY DETECTION
By Sola and Velarde
Visualizing any domain in an easily understood way is a challenge in itself, additional dimen-
sions of data inherently makes this much more difficult. Fisseha Gidey and Charles Awono Onana
argue in their paper on computer visualization, High Dimensional Data Visualization: Advances
and Challenges that, “...the ever increasing dimensions of datasets, the physical limitations of
the display screen (2D/3D), and the relatively small capacity of our mind to process complex data
at a time pose a challenge in the process of visualization” [38].
There are various options for visualizing anomaly detection. The Nokia Group Research
Center models their anomaly detection system using a self-organizing map which functioned as
as a way to detect when a feature is acting abnormally while reducing the amount of data that
needs to be monitored [41]. Another example includes generalizing the anomaly detection system
as a time-series monitoring system. This allows an analyst to notice alarming data points in real
time and functions for all different types of domains [71]. Some visualizations include utilizing
machine learning techniques to classify and cluster anomalies in their visualizations [23].
In this MQP, we had the challenge of visualizing high dimensional data while perceiving and
detecting anomalies. For this reason, we found it best to experiment with several different visual-
ization technologies and techniques. Among the technologies used are d3 [17], and MatPlotLib’s
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) graphs [29].
8.1 Requirements for Visualization
To develop our visualization, we chose requirements that would encompass a flexible system
to run different analyses on the dataset, compute different features dynamically, and validate
the different anomalies found in the VAST dataset challenge. Our requirements are as follows:
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1. Viewing the Regular Log Data
a) Upload the original firewall logs data with server-side pagination in order for an
analyst to observe what is happening in the system.
b) Allow the analyst themselves to use their own knowledge of networks to be able to
observe if any logs appear curious or out of the normal.
2. Allow Flexibility in Choosing Time Slices to Analyze and Run RPCA Dynamically
a) Allowing a user to select which time-slices to analyze by providing a way to select
which logs to examine given a specific date and time.
b) Computes features dynamically to allow for less memory storage being used and
incorporate the ability to compute new features if more data is added.
3. Ability to Observe Ground Truth
a) Since the answers for this particular challenge is available, the ability to cross-validate
the answers in the front-end will allow to receive live-feedback on both our feature
generation and the mathematical analysis being ran.
b) Ensure that your features tell a story within your modeling of data.
4. Ability to Quickly Detect Abnormal Behavior.
a) Alert a user if a log is anomalous, it is critical to include a way to warn the user that
something requires their immediate attention.
b) This feature will also reduce the amount of analysis an analyst needs to do, as they can
focus their primary attention to those values that we highlight as potential threats.
5. Exploring More Information About RPCA Values
a) Provide the full-picture of the mathematical analysis by providing a way to recover
more detailed information on the results from RPCA.
b) It is imperative to balance showing enough information for an analyst to comfortably
observe data and allowing further exploration without it becoming overwhelming.
Finalizing these requirements lead us to think critically about the different visualization
tools available to create this product. In our implementation section, we consider the different
aspects of libraries, user interactivity, and how to frame our web application in an effective and
user-friendly manner.
8.2 Overview of Web Application and Implementation
Our visualization system is comprised of a simple interface where users can choose a time
slice of the VAST dataset to run anomaly detection. The firewall logs are displayed for a user to
examine any raw logs before choosing a slice. Following the selection, the application displays an
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anomaly matrix visualization, and a tSNE component which depicts our features with and without
RPCA. In this section, we focus on the primary function of the web application – dynamically
running features on time-slices and the anomaly matrix visualization and its implementation.
8.2.1 Web Application Components
1. Home Page
Figure 8.1: Home page that display original raw logs.
Upon entering the web application, a user will see the raw firewall logs in the VAST dataset.
We used a React data mapping to display the firewall logs on the home page through server
side pagination. A user can start our anomaly detection system here after pciking a time
slice.
2. Anomaly Matrix Table
Figure 8.2: Anomaly matrix table produced by RPCA.
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After a user has ran our anomaly detection system on a specified time slice, the anomaly
matrix will be displayed. The matrix has is comprised of S values from RPCA. By hovering
over cells a tool tip with M and M - S values will appear. Along with RPCA relevant values
are the raw firewall log information. In doing so, if a row is determined to be anomalous an
analyst can quickly see information regarding that entry.
3. tSNE Exploration
Figure 8.3: tSNE visualizations. Left is tSNE ran on our feature set. Right is tSNE ran on the S
matrix produced by RPCA.
By navigating to the tSNE tab, a user can run our tSNE visualization. To the left is tSNE
ran on our feature matrix and to the right is tSNE ran with the RPCA anomaly matrix. Our
results with tSNE are preliminary and we explain how tSNE can be leveraged in chapter 8.
8.2.2 Choosing a Visualization Library
The first step on creating a visualization system was examining how much customization
was needed to create the different perspectives we wanted to highlight in our web application.
Although several libraries exist to create graphs, such as c3 [68], recharts [78], nvd3 [67], etc,
they tend to limit the flexibility of creating unique and specific purpose visualizations. Our final
decision rested tbetween d3 and Recharts due to their ability to create compelling results. Table
8.1 depicts our final analysis on these libraries.
We concluded that d3 would fit our application the best since d3 is a flexible and powerful
visualization system. Although it does have a steep learning curve, there are several examples
that we could follow along and it has a big online community available to ask questions. In
addition, its flexibility makes it easy to adapt its visualizations if the set of features change. For
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d3 Recharts
Pros Cons Pros Cons
• Customization
• Large commu-
nity and several
resources
• Interactive compo-
nents
• Steep learning
curve
• Renders Quickly
and Smoothly
• Fairly extensible
library
• Responsive
• Intuitive
• Depends on Re-
act.js
• Limited examples
available
Table 8.1: Pros and cons of d3 and Recharts [7], [78]. These were the last two libraries that we
were evaluating for our visualization system.
our application, we created a table using d3 and color coded it based on the values in the S-Matrix
produced by rPCA. We highlighted anomalies in red, and allowed user analysts to explore the M
and M-S values by using a tooltip to avoid the cluttering of data.
8.2.3 Web Framework
With the creation of each visualization it was important to consider the presentation of the
graphs, or techniques. We designed a React application, using Flask as the backend framework.
Flask’s microframework nature allowed us to quickly set up the skeleton of our application while
focusing more on the front end aspects of the React app.
In order to create an easy to use and intuitive application we start the web application loading
the original user logs with server-side pagination. After visualizing the log activity, in order by
date, the user can select a date range that includes the date, hour, minutes and even seconds in
which they want to run the feature analysis. In a real world system, one could imagine current
log activity display in a similar fashion. After a user examines the data set and have chosen a
time slice for feature analysis, the Flask backend sets in motion a series of backend API calls to
our manager. Our web app takes advantage of quick mySQL queries and creates a table called
working set which includes the specific log files selected by the user. The working set table is
redefined whenever a user chooses a time slice. Then, we create features based on that slice, and
finally, we ran RPCA to create an anomaly csv that depicts the features and the original data.
The csv is hosted and read with d3. As mentioned in the previous section, we display a table with
the anomaly csv information and highlight those anomalies that have an S value greater than
one with different shades of red to indicate how severe we think it is and include interactive
tooltips for the M and M-S matrix.
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Figure 8.4: Depicts the tooltip for M and M-S Values. M is the original values and M-S is the
predicted value of the cell examined.
8.2.4 Data for Table
As outlined in chapter 4, we had upwards of 100 columns in our features. A table that
contains that much information would completely overwhelm the user as they would have to
scroll horizontally to be able to see them, and would never be able to get the full scope of each row.
Therefore, we decided to consolidate the destination and source ip/port features into one column
to reduce the amount of columns. To do this, we paired up each row’s actual port or address to the
feature that was provided in RPCA. In other words, we took the maximum value in the S matrix
corresponding to each row and feature pair and displayed it to the user. This made a significant
impact in the number of columns as it reduced it to around 30.
In addition, we wanted to display the original data (M) and the predicted value (M-S matrix)
so the analyst could explore the original data and compare RPCA’s prediction to what the actual
values were. At first, we played with idea of displaying them in the same table cell if S was greater
than a certain threshold that signaled an anomaly. However, that made each cell inconsistent
and it seemed to display more information that was necessary. We created a tooltip for each cell
in the row that was related to an S matrix. This would allow an analyst to decide which values
he or she is curious about and selectively view the M and M-S values as depicted in Figure 8.4.
Finally, we created a color scale to highlight S matrix values according to the level of severity.
Currently, the scale darkens as the number gets bigger towards a dark red. We picked red since
it unequivocally has a sense of urgency attached to it. We used ColorBrewer [18] to find other
colors that would meld nicely with the red. Figure 8.5, is the table with its full ranges, with light
yellow representing a neutral value.
8.3 Case Studies
In order to explain how our system would work if an analyst used it. We created case studies
of how the work flow of the application functions and highlight the different attacks that our
anomaly detection system was able to find. This section illustrates the specific steps a system
analyst can do to find potential anomalies and how it is currently cross validated.
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Figure 8.5: Color scale that portrays warnings, here the larger the S value, the darker the
background color.
8.3.1 System Analyst Explores Web Framework to Detect Remote Desktop
Protocol
1. Viewing Log Data
Figure 8.6: Viewing VAST firewall log data in our web application
The process of analyzing data would begin with our home screen depicting the firewall logs.
In a real time environment this could update as different firewall logs come in.
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2. Using Date Selector
Figure 8.7: Date Selectors in application. Here you would choose dates to run RPCA on a specified
time slice.
After the user decides which data to run feature analysis on, they select a date, hour,
minutes, and seconds in which to generate the features. To view the Remote Desktop
Protocol attack, the selected time would be April 14th 13:30:45, and April 14th 13:32:10.
3. Observing the Anomaly Matrix
Figure 8.8: Visualization of RPCA anomaly matrix in web application.
We used our visualization system in order to cross validate attacks with the ground truth
data. As mentioned in chapter 2, the remote desktop protocol attack was socially engineered
from an external IP address of AFC’s network. In Figure ?? we examined a subset of data
with both anomalous and normal data.
4. Exploring M and M-S Values
Figure 8.9: Example of how M and M-S values are depicted.
If an analyst is further interested in the M and M - S values it is easily accessible by
hovering over the S values. This will display a tooltip that shows both values and could be
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examined further. Although in this MQP we did not explore these values, it could expand
the anomaly detection process.
The features that captured this attack were the security concern port and the source and
destination outside features. Our cross validation was simple because the solution manual pro-
vided all anomalous data. However, one could imagine a network analyst using our visualization
system, noticing the red scale color warning, and making an informed observation of this attack.
8.3.2 System Analyst Explores Web Framework to Detect UDC
Another example of using our visualization system to detect attack is the undocumented
computer attack. As mentioned in chapter 2, the attack stemmed from suspicious activity from a
computer outside of AFC’s network. To generate this result, the start and end time entered were
April 15th 14:05:52 and April 15th 14:06:53, respectively. The feature that flagged the attack
here is the destination outside network feature. Again, we used the ground truth data to cross
validate this attack, but in a real world system the red color scale warning would notify a system
analyst to further examine the log and make an informed observation.
Figure 8.10: Undocumented computer attack shown in anomaly matrix. Here we cross validated
that our features found this attack by referencing the ground truth.
8.4 High Dimensional Visualization with tSNE
Beyond validation, we went further and explored the use of an algorithm that could handle
high-dimensional data. In particular, we decided to explore the use of tSNE [49], an award
winning technique to visualize these types of data sets.
In Figure 8.11, tSNE is ran on two different sets of data. The left most visualization incor-
porates the final features created in our back-end as outlined in chapter 4, while the rightmost
shows the S values for the same feature set to compare the clustering results. This allows further
analysis into the possibilities of using tSNE or other high visualization algorithms combined with
RPCA to find anomalies promptly. An interesting result to note was that in the tSNE visualization
without RPCA, we observe that the ground-truth anomalies (in purple) are very distinctly in
two different clusters – yet in the visualization with RPCA, the anomalies (pictured in red) are
considered less different. This highlights the impact tSNE and RPCA could have in an anomaly
detection process. It is important to note that in order to confirm that the anomalies are in the
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Figure 8.11: tSNE visualization using our features. To the left is the visualization with our
features and to the right is post-RPCA
clusters mentioned above, it would require a clustering algorithm such as K-means [54], which is
highlighted in our recommendations.
Figure 8.12: Flowchart of tSNE result creation. One of our goals in closing the loop in an anomaly
detection system and running tSNE dynamically is another example of this.
Detailed in Figure 8.12 is the process that an analyst would follow to recreate the example in
Figure 8.11. To continue providing exploratory grounds for the analyst, the tSNE visualization
is ran in the user-defined time-slice. The workflow of an analyst would include observing which
data-points or clusters are distinguishable from regular data and further investigate in the S
matrix values table if those data points show a concerning value. This would provide a way to
further close the loop of anomaly detection.
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FUTURE WORK/RECOMMENDATIONS
By Guth, Sola, and Velarde
9.1 Limitations
Our project had several, important to note limitations. In our case, we were examining a
limited 4-day dataset. In one hand, it contained a significant amount of data (12 million rows)
because of the DDoS. Nevertheless, in a real-world system that tracked cyber security logs, this
would steadily increase and would create difficulties in both memory and performance. If a project
in the future continued using time-slices to calculate features, it would be feasible to manage
more data. However, analyzing it would take a more scalable system.
Due to the time-constraints in the length of the project, there are certain characteristics of
the current project that could not be generalized. For example, when we run our RPCA code, we
provide every row in our feature generation, which includes some data that must be ignored. We
currently ignore it explicitly in our code, but in the future a solution that can provide analysis
and be able to identify which columns are anomalies without having to hard code those columns
would be extremely valuable.
Currently, the code that has been written for our application is both in Python 2.7 and 3.6.
We have a script that depends upon certain environments existing (as detailed in our readme)
[65], which switches between Python versions. In an ideal world, both of these applications would
be written in the same version of Python.
9.2 Build Application on one Python Version
Throughout this project we continued feature engineering work that was written in Python
2.7. Given time, we would try to port our code base to exclusively using Python 3. Although, there
is no limit to the documentation of Python 2 code, it would be better for efficiency and flexibility
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to build the anomaly detection system exclusively in Python 3 [60]. This would eliminate the
necessity of having two virtual environments and using a bash script to change Python versions
in the middle of a run cycle. If a team were to continue our work, a first step would be to ensure
that the code repository is translated into Python 3 or start from scratch in Python 3 and use our
code and paper as a starting point. Python 3 should be used for the infrastructure of this MQP
considering that most Python 2 code is now legacy code.
If the next team would like to use our code and not rewrite the entire repository it could be
worthwhile to translate the code with Python’s Futurize library, as stated in chapter 5.
9.3 Explore clustering with tSNE to visualize features
We created a tSNE visualization using d3 to explore how reducing the dimensionality of our
feature set would translate in our anomaly detection system and its usability to further explore
the concerns. In an interview with David Beach [13], we discussed the meaning of Figure 8.11 and
the possibilities of using tSNE for this project. In tSNE, it is critical to understand the feature
space, since it focuses on clusters and distances become meaningless. In Beach’s work, he used
the firewall logs to detect connections between machines and calculate the probability that a node
will communicate with another. With his work, he was able to visualize the different instances
in which attacks were occurring in the dataset. To be able to use these features, think in terms
of the manifold, and define what it means for two points to be close to each other could help
increase the analysis of a dataset to help prevent attacks [13]. An interesting angle to explore
would be to classify the clusters using an algorithm such as k-means [54]. This would allow color
coding on the front-end and exploring different parameters in tSNE to observe the different
results and highlight clusters that might be anomalous. Finally, it would be interesting to add
more interactivity so that an analyst can decide which tSNE parameters they would like to run
themselves and analyze the outliers more carefully.
9.4 Data Smoothing
One could imagine some form of data smoothing being applied to the dataset to reduce noisy
information and allowing outliers to become more apparent. Data smoothing has not been applied
in this project, but from a mathematical perspective, it would be interesting to see how smoothing
would affect the anomaly detection system for this dataset. In financial investment software
smoothing has been used to explain the behavior of stocks and determine patterns in the market
[44].
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9.5 Rule Generation Interface
In this report, we have outlined several feature sets to detect attacks in the VAST dataset.
These feature sets could be modified and made into rules that could be toggled. In the future,
it would be interesting to apply rule generation for this dataset challenge, and extend the
generalization solution we have proposed. A network administrator could use rules with a
firewall log file to detect certain instances of possibly malicious behavior. There can be a system
where a set of rules exist for a data set. These rules could then be generated in a web platform
by a user depending on what they are interested in. For example, a network administrator may
be interested in detecting IP addresses from untrusted clients. In this instance, they may only
want to apply a rule set that corresponds to that case. The problem with this is an increasing
amount of rule sets that would require constant updating. However through a learning algorithm,
there could be an anomaly detection system that generates rules for a set. Such an algorithm
is explored in Learning Rules for Anomaly Detection of Hostile Network Traffic by Matthew V.
Mahoney and Philip K. Chan [50].
9.6 Monte Carlo Method
As discussed previously in this report, finding optimal values of µ and ρ for improving the
rate of convergence of RPCA can be difficult [46]. For any given matrix (or subset of firewall logs
in this project), there can be different µ and ρ value combinations that would be optimal for
increasing the rate of convergence for RPCA. The process for finding values of µ and ρ that were
different from the theoretical ones [46] in this report was random, as it was unknown what µ
and ρ values would be good for a given matrix. For finding optimal values of µ and ρ for a given
matrix, a Monte Carlo method for approximation of µ and ρ could be implemented [32]. A Monte
Carlo method works by defining a domain of possible inputs in which a solution exists (values of
µ and ρ in this case), randomly generating inputs from a probability distribution the domain, and
then computing the and aggregating the results of a given pair of variables [16]. An approach
like this over a domain of µ and ρ for a given matrix should produce optimal values for rate of
convergence of RPCA, but would require that µ and ρ be bounded above for a finite domain of
potential values, otherwise the brute force approach would have nowhere to stop.
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CONCLUSION
By Guth, Sola, and Velarde
Anomaly detection is devised of several components that make it complex and hard to
standardize. Engineering features that can be applied in various situations and ensuring that a
data analyst can generate features on demand is a stepping stone towards facilitating the process.
In this Major Qualifying Project, we used feature engineering and Robust Principal Component
Analysis to detect anomalous behavior in the 2011 VAST dataset challenge. Throughout this
project we were able to detect multiple attacks in the dataset including: denial of service, socially
engineered remote desktop infiltration, and undocumented computers appearing in a company’s
network. Through our web application, we connected the loop between a system analyst and
mathematician. A user can quickly query the dataset and choose exactly which times they would
like to examine and run features on. From here, it is simple to see which rows can be out of
the normal trend. Through several iterations of the feature engineering process we found a
feature library that RPCA agreed with and is also generalized. Without much effort we could
ingest another company’s network architecture, mainly IP address and ports information and
find behavior out of the realm of that network.
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